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State Practice in the Management and 
Allocation of Transboundary Groundwater 
Resources in North America
Gabriel Eckstein and Amy Hardberger
I.  I N T RODUC T ION
In recent years, groundwater has garnered growing attention as a  signi6 cant 
source of freshwater. Groundwater is currently the most extracted  natural 
resource in the world with a global withdrawal rate of 600–700 cubic 
 kilometres per year.1 In Europe, groundwater accounts for 60–99 percent 
of drinking water, while, throughout the United States, the percentage 
ranges from 50–97 percent.2 In some rural areas, groundwater meets nearly 
100 percent of users’ daily needs.3 As water demands continue to increase 
globally so will the dependence on groundwater. This increased reliance 
presents challenges because many aquifers are subject to waste, contamin-
ation, overexploitation, and other maladies that threaten hundreds of aqui-
fers worldwide and make the need for agreements even more necessary.4 
These challenges are especially evident in the international context.
Historically, the signi6 cance of groundwater as a source of fresh-
water was disregarded, its hydrological dynamics misunderstood, and its 
 management inconsistent and sometimes irrational. As a result, or possibly 
another symptom, groundwater resources received considerably less atten-
tion in international law and relations among nations than have surface 
waters.5 Today, while a growing body of international law governs trans-
boundary rivers and lakes worldwide, a gap in the law means that virtually 
1 See S.S.D. Foster and P.J. Chilton, Groundwater: The Processes and Global Signi6 cance of 
Aquifer Degradation 358 Phil. Trans. Royal Soc’y London B: Biological Sciences 1957 (2003), 
<http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1693287&blobtype=pdf>; see also 
Water for People, Water for Life, the United Nations World Water Development Report, at 
78 (2003).
2 G. Eckstein and Y. Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground 
Water Resources and International Law 19 Amer. U. Int’l L. Rev. 201 at 202 (2003).
3 Texas Water Development Board 2 Water for Texas 13 (2007).
4 See G. Eckstein, Commentary on the U.N. International Law Commission’s Draft Articles 
on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers 18 Colo. J. Int’l Envt’l L. & Pol’y 537 at 539, n. 7 (2007) 
(providing examples of overexploitation and degradation of aquifers worldwide).
5 Eckstein and Eckstein, supra note 2 at 222–31.
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no widely accepted international norms govern transboundary aquifers.6 
This gap, however, may be slowly 6 lling as a result of the development of 
customary law, which is traceable, in large part, to the conduct of subna-
tional actors.
International law is generally understood to emerge from formal and direct 
lawmaking actions by the larger international community. Treaties and con-
ventions adopted by states represent formally accepted and codi6 ed norms of 
international law.7 Another source of international law is de6 ned by custom-
ary international law. Customary international law is international law that 
emerges from a broad and consistent practice of states justi6 ed by a belief 
that such conduct is legally appropriate and mandated.8 In the case of trans-
boundary groundwater resources, while few formal international instruments 
focus on transboundary aquifers,9 a growing number of subnational prac-
tices around the world suggest an emerging trend in the management of trans-
boundary groundwater resources. Subnational political units are engaging 
in arrangements addressing the management of aquifers that traverse their 
international boundaries. In the European context, where most small inter-
national transboundary aquifers are now managed directly by local author-
ities under local transboundary arrangements,10 this trend appears more 
formalized because of the European Outline Convention on the Transfrontier 
Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (European 
Outline Convention), which authorizes subnational units to enter into trans-
boundary arrangements under certain circumstances.11 In contrast, in North 
America, the respective federal governments have provided little if any guid-
ance for, or shown any interest in, such local initiatives. Nonetheless, even in 
North America, it is safe to say that transboundary groundwater resources 
are now legitimate subjects for international cooperation.12
6 See generally Eckstein, supra note 4.
7 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, at 11–12 (5th edn, 1998); see 
also Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1060, Article 38(1)(a), 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0>.
8 See generally Brownlie, supra note 7 at 4–11; see also Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, supra note 7, Article 38(1)(b).
9 See Eckstein and Eckstein, supra note 2 at 224–7.
10 Jochen Sohnle, Transboundary Aquifers and Local Transfrontier Co-operation in Europe, 
unpublished report prepared for the UNILC Special Rapporteur, His Excellency, Ambassador 
Chusei Yamada and the UNESCO Ground Water Experts Group, February 2006 [on 6 le with 
authors].
11 European Outline Convention on the Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial 
Communities or Authorities (21 May 1980), 20 I.L.M. 315 (1981) [European Outline 
Convention]. This purpose of this treaty is to encourage and facilitate trans-border cooper-
ation between communities or authorities on both sides of an international boundary on 
issues relevant to both sides, especially in the 6 elds of ‘regional, urban and rural develop-
ment, environmental protection, the improvement of public facilities and services and mutual 
assistance in emergencies’ (ibid. at Preamble).
12 Cf. G. Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Perspective of the Status of Ground Water Resources 
Under the UN Watercourse Convention 30 Columbia J. of Envt’l Law 525 at 528–9 (2005) 
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The purpose of this article is to investigate more closely this trend and 
to identify speci6 c concepts resulting from such local initiatives that might 
serve as a basis for customary international law. While it is not intended as 
a comparative study in relation to the European experience, it presents the 
North American experience in a way that should be informative for such an 
inquiry in the future. Speci6 cally, this article focuses on the governance of 
transboundary groundwater resources in North America. It begins by iden-
tifying and reviewing various arrangements over transboundary aquifers 
between Mexico and the United States, between Canada and the United 
States, and between the continental states of the United States.13 Although 
the arrangements discussed in this article represent diverse geographic and 
geologic conditions, commonalities in norms and principles can be identi-
6 ed in areas such as cooperation, prior noti6 cation of planned activities, 
sharing of data and information, public participation, and a preference for 
subsidiarity and local solutions for local issues.
This article proposes that many of these commonalitites evidence 
 emerging state practice and should be considered and evaluated as bases 
for emerging customary international law. Moreover, recent trends sug-
gest a change in the function of regional agreements and their role in the 
development of international custom as evidenced by the growing import-
ance and effectiveness of local and regional transboundary arrangements14 
that are tailored to local characteristics and circumstances. Signi6 cantly, 
these trends are especially unique in that the majority of the arrangements 
identi6 ed are unof6 cial pacts without formal endorsement of the respect-
ive governments. Additionally, of those arrangements, the vast majority 
are subnational pacts rather than pacts between national governments. 
Ultimately, in identifying and characterizing such commonalities and 
characteristics, as well as the experiences on which they are based, this 
study aims to offer insight into evolving customary international law as 
well as suggestions for the development of new arrangements related to the 
management of transboundary groundwater resources.
(asserting that internationally shared groundwater resources are now ‘a legitimate subject of 
international law’).
13 Full text versions of all of the agreements discussed in this article can be found at <http://
www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
14 As used in this article, the phrase ‘local and regional transboundary arrangements’ 
denotes agreements over freshwater resources that traverse a political boundary. This 
includes arrangements between entities in different countries as well as those between subna-
tional units. The term ‘arrangement’ is used to encompass agreements that may be those that 
are of6 cially or formally recognized by the respective governments as well as those that are 
either informal or non-binding agreements or those not formally recognized by the respective 
sovereign. An example of the latter is an internationally transboundary waters arrangement 
entered into by local entities on either side of a political border but which are not of6 cially 
recognized by the respective national governments.
Book 1.indb   98 11/18/2008   5:18:15 PM
TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER RESOURCES 99
I I.  T H E A R R A NGEM EN T S
1. Mexico–United States Border
The problems that can arise from an international shared resource are 
clearly seen on the border between the United States and Mexico. The 
Mexico-US border extends more than 3,100 kilometres from the Gulf of 
Mexico to the Paci6 c Ocean15 and overlies as many as twenty aquifers that 
traverse the international boundary.16 No formal federal agreements exist 
between Mexico and the United States addressing the management, allo-
cation, or protection of any of the border aquifers. However, a number of 
instruments encourage and facilitate cooperation between the two nations 
at the local and at the national levels in the management of transboundary 
aquifers.
A. Minutes of the International Boundary and 
Water Commission (IBWC)
The IBWC is a bi-national commission, composed of a Mexican and a 
United States section, responsible for enforcing water treaties and settling 
disputes on the Mexico-US border.17 The commission’s current structure 
and water mandate originates with the 1944 Treaty between the United 
States of America and Mexico Relating to the utilization of the Waters of 
the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (1944 US-Mexico 
Treaty).18 The IBWC implements its mandate and commitments through the 
formulation of minutes. Minutes are decisions or recommendations of the 
IBWC, which, once approved by both governments, become binding obliga-
tions on the countries.19
15 See D. Woodward and R. Durall, United States-Mexico Border Area, as Delineated by 
a Shared-Water Resources Perspective, U.S. Dept. of the Interior Field Coordinating Fact 
Sheet 1, February 1996, <http://www.cerc.usgs.gov/FCC/pubs/Fact_sheets/Fact_1/DOI_
US-MX_Border_FCC_Fact_sheet_1.html>.
16 See Good Neighbor Environmental Board, Water Resources Management on the U.S.-
Mexico Border, Eighth Report to the President and the Congress of the United States (2005), 
<http://www.epa.gov/ocem/gneb/gneb8threport/gneb8threport.pdf> (identifying twenty 
aquifers on the border); and S. Mumme, Minute 242 and Beyond: Challenges and Opportunities 
for Managing Transboundary Ground water on the Mexico-U.S. Border 40 Nat. Resources J. 
341 at 344 and 363–77 (2000) (identifying eighteen aquifers on the border).
17 S. Mumme, Innovation and Reform in Transboundary Resource Management: A Critical 
Look at the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico 33 
Nat. Res. J. 93 at 94–5 (1993).
18 Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico Relating to the Utilization of 
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, and supplementary proto-
col, 59 Stat. 1219 (14 November 1944).
19 Alberto Szekely, How to Accommodate an Uncertain Future into Institutional 
Responsiveness and Planning: The Case of Mexico and the United States, 33 Nat. Resources J. 
397 at 398 (1993).
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Minute 242 of the IBWC was enacted in August 1973.20 It was designed 
to address the increasing salinity of the Colorado River and requires the 
United States to deliver water of a minimum water salinity level to Mexico. 
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Minute 242 also address groundwater in the border 
region. To the extent that these paragraphs create binding obligations, they 
represent the only evidence of a formal agreement between Mexico and the 
United States on the region’s transboundary aquifers. Paragraph 5 provides 
that, pending the development of a ‘comprehensive’ groundwater agreement 
for the border region, both countries agree to limit groundwater pumping 
within a precisely de6 ned geographic region along the Arizona-Sonora 
 border near San Luis to speci6 cally enumerated withdrawal  targets.21 
Imposing a more aspirational obligation, paragraph 6 requires both coun-
tries to consult each other prior to pursuing any new development of surface 
or groundwater resources, or any other action, that could adversely impact 
the other country. This obligation, drafted with the stated goal of ‘avoiding 
future problems,’ applies to all transboundary aquifers along the border.22
Another agreement that is relevant to the border’s groundwater resources 
is Minute 289.23 Enacted in November 1992, it is designed to address water 
quality in the lower Rio Grande River along the Mexico-US border. Although 
the majority of the minute focuses on the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers, 
paragraph 4 references the Integrated Border Environmental Plan adopted 
by Mexico and the United States in 1992 and calls for the establishment of 
a water monitoring program and database to observe surface and ground-
water quality along the US-Mexico border. The paragraph also lists those 
agencies on both sides of the border that are to participate in the joint moni-
toring program.24
B. Memorandum of Understanding between City of Juárez, 
Mexico Utilities and the El Paso Water Utilities Public Services 
Board of the City of El Paso, Texas (Juárez-El Paso MOU)25
The Hueco Bolson Aquifer, which underlies the border sister cities of 
Juárez, Chihuahua, in Mexico and El Paso, Texas, in the United States, 
20 Minute 242: Permanent and De6 nite Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity 
of the Colorado River, International Boundary and Water Commission (30 August 1974), 
<http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Minute 242].
21 Ibid.   22 Ibid.
23 Minute 289: Observation of the Quality of the Waters Along the United States and 
Mexico Border, International Boundary and Water Commission (11 December 1992), <http://
www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
24 Ibid.
25 Memorandum of Understanding between City of Juárez, Mexico Utilities and the El 
Paso Water Utilities Public Services Board of the City of El Paso, Texas (6 December 1999) 
[Juárez-El Paso MOU], <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.
html>.
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serves as a principal source of freshwater for both communities: nearly 
100 percent for Juárez, and approximately 30 percent for El Paso.26 As a 
result of this dependence, the aquifer has undergone considerable mining in 
recent decades, and concerns have been raised over the aquifer’s viability as 
an ongoing source of freshwater for the region.
In an effort to generate cooperation over the management and 
 exploitation of the Hueco Bolson, the municipal utility companies of 
the two  cities entered into a legally non-binding memorandum of under-
standing in 1999. This arrangement focuses on the region’s groundwater 
by ‘seek[ing] to identify the mechanisms between the parties to increase 
communications, cooperation, and implementation of transboundary 
projects of common interest.’ In its stated goals of ‘general objectives,’ the 
Juárez-El Paso MOU alludes to data and information sharing related to 
transboundary natural resources and to cooperation in the management, 
use, and protection of natural resources that traverse an international 
boundary.27
C. United States of America and the United Mexican States 
Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the 
Environment in the Border Area (La Paz Agreement)28
The La Paz Agreement promotes cooperation for environmental protection 
on the border. While the agreement is not directly related to groundwater 
resources, it does contain general language that implicates transboundary 
aquifers. The treaty obligates both parties to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
sources of pollution in their respective territory where such pollution affects 
the others’ border region; cooperate in addressing environmental problems 
of mutual interest; and coordinate practical, legal, institutional, and tech-
nical measures designed to protect environmental quality in the border 
area, including coordinating national programs, scienti6 c and educational 
exchanges, environmental monitoring, environmental impact assessment, 
and regular exchanges of data and information on transboundary pollution 
originating in each country’s territory.29 It is noteworthy that none of the 
provisions in this agreement can prejudice or otherwise affect existing or 
26 Final Report: Second Coordination Workshop, UNESCO/OAS ISARM Americas 
Programme—Transboundary Aquifers of the Americas, El Paso, Texas, 10–12 November 
2004 (2005), <http://www.oas.org/usde/isarm/Documents/English/ISARM%20Americas%
202004-%20El%20Paso%20Workshop%20Report.pdf>.
27 Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 25.
28 United States of America and the United Mexican States Agreement on Cooperation 
for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (14 August 
1983), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [La Paz 
Agreement].
29 Ibid., Article 2 and 3.
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future agreements concluded between the United States and Mexico includ-
ing those relating to the region’s waters.30
D. United States–Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act31
The United States–Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act was 
designed to address the lack of consensus between the two nations on the 
source and availability of future water supplies along the border. The Act 
mandates the creation of a scienti6 c program to comprehensively assess 
the region’s transboundary aquifers, especially those deemed to be prior-
ity transboundary aquifers.32 The program is also expected to develop the 
scienti6 c foundation for national, state, and local of6 cials to address press-
ing water resource challenges in the region. It directs the secretary of the 
US Department of the Interior to implement this program in cooperation 
with the IBWC, the three participating US border states of Arizona, New 
Mexico, and Texas, certain water resources research institutes, affected 
Indian tribes, and other appropriate federal and state agencies. While the 
Act itself is not a transboundary arrangement, it does obligate the secre-
tary, ‘to the maximum extent practicable,’ to work with all of these entities 
‘to develop partnerships with, and receive input from, relevant organiza-
tions in Mexico to carry out the program.’33 The Act was signed into law in 
December 2006. While it is authorized to be funded for up to US $50 million 
over its ten-year life span, it was initially funded for US $1 million in early 
2008.34
The Act speci6 cally provides that it shall not affect: (1) the jurisdiction or 
responsibility of a participating state with respect to managing its surface 
or groundwater resources; (2) the water rights of any person or entity using 
water from a transboundary aquifer; or (3) state water law or an interstate 
30 Ibid., Article 18.
31 United States–Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, Public Law 109–448, 
120 Stat. 3328–3332, issued on 22 December 2006, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/
Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
32 Ibid. at sec. 4.
33 Ibid. at sec. 4 and 5. According to the US Geological Survey at the US Department of 
Interior, one of the agencies tasked with implementing this act, ‘[e]arly into the program, it 
would be essential that binational consensus be reached on common investigative approaches, 
common 6 eld data collection protocols, laboratory methodologies, and data management, 
documentation, and reporting systems. Once these technical issues are resolved, it would be 
much easier to streamline the treaty requirements related to the review and public release of 
impartial, transboundary scienti6 c data. Such consensus has been reached in the past for 
transboundary investigations having limited scope. Obtaining this consensus for the entire 
Border region would greatly enhance transboundary scienti6 c collaboration in the future.’ 
Statement of Charles G. Groat, Director, US Geological Survey, US Department of the 
Interior, to the Subcommittee on Water and Power, US Senate Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resource, 19 May 2004.
34 Ibid. at sec. 8; US Geological Survey, FY 2008 Budget Funding Tables, <http://www.
usgs.gov/budget/2008/08funding_tables.asp>.
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compact or international treaty governing water. The Act also states that it 
shall not delay or alter the implementation or operation of any works within 
the territorial limits of the United States relating to the waters governed by 
the 1944 US-Mexico Treaty.35
2. Canada-US Border
As expansive as the Mexico-US border is, the border region between Canada 
and the United States is more than three times that length—approximately 
11,370 kilometres. While this border region is also marked by diverse cli-
mates and geography, it contains far greater quantities of freshwater and 
nearly 300 transboundary waterways and aquifers. Unlike the Mexico-US 
region, Canada and the United States do not compete for groundwater 
resources primarily because of the abundance of surface water in the 
region.36 Today, no formal agreement exists between the two nations dir-
ectly addressing transboundary groundwater resources along the common 
border. Nonetheless, a number of agreements at various levels of govern-
ment are relevant to transboundary aquifers.
A. Canada-US Agreements
The 6 rst in a series of treaties relating to boundary waters between Canada 
and the United States, the 1909 Treaty between the United States and Great 
Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising between the 
United States and Canada provides the principles and mechanisms for 
preventing and resolving disputes over water quality and quantity along 
the Canadian-US boundary (Boundary Waters Treaty).37 To achieve these 
goals, the treaty establishes the International Joint Commission (IJC), 
an independent bi-national organization created to prevent and resolve 
disputes relating to the use and quality of boundary waters along the 
Canadian-US border.38
Although groundwater is not directly mentioned in the treaty, Article IV 
prohibits both countries from allowing ‘boundary waters and waters N ow-
ing across the boundary [to] be polluted on either side to the injury of health 
or property on the other.’39 While the de6 nition of ‘boundary waters’ limits 
the term to surface waters, the article appears to contemplate other types 
of N owing waters. Nevertheless, the Canadian government, through their 
35 Ibid. at sec. 6.
36 A. Rivera, Trans-Boundary Water in Canada, paper presented at the thirty-third 
International Association of Hydrogeologists Congress, Zacatecas, Mexico, 11–15 October 
2004 [on 6 le with author].
37 Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and 
Questions Arising between the United States and Canada (11 January 1909), <http://www.
internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Boundary Waters Treaty].
38 Ibid., Articles. 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10.   39 Ibid. at 4.
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embassy in Washington, DC, has explicitly indicated that they do not inter-
pret the treaty as encompassing groundwater resources.40
Groundwater, however, is considered in the Great Lake Water Quality 
Agreement (Great Lake Agreement), which was signed under the auspices 
of the IJC on 22 November 1978.41 Although predominantly a surface water 
agreement, a number of the provisions refer to groundwater both expressly 
and impliedly. For example, Article VI(q) of the Great Lake Agreement, 
which is entitled ‘Programs and Other Measures,’ provides express refer-
ence to groundwater by requiring the parties to ‘develop and implement 
programs and other measures to ful6 ll the purpose of [the] agreement,’ 
including formulating ‘programs for the assessment and control of con-
taminated groundwater and subsurface sources entering’ the waters subject 
to the jurisdiction of the IJC.42 Annex 16 to the treaty, entitled ‘Pollution 
from Contaminated Groundwater,’ provides additional details on the spe-
ci6 cs of the program, including identifying existing and potential sources 
of contaminated groundwater; mapping hydrogeological conditions of 
groundwater; developing a standard approach and procedure for sampling 
and analyzing groundwater to assess contamination and estimate con-
taminant loading from groundwater to the Great Lakes; and controlling 
 contamination.43 In addition, while not an explicit reference, Article 1 of 
the Great Lake Agreement offers a de6 nition for the ‘Great Lakes System,’ 
which reasonably can be interpreted to encompass related groundwaters. 
Article 1 de6 nes the term as all ‘streams, rivers, lakes and other bodies of 
water that are within the drainage basin on the St. Lawrence River.’44 While 
the focus of the Great Lake Agreement is on the surface waters of the Great 
Lakes, the language of the agreement provides both explicit and implicit 
obligations with regard to groundwater related to the Great Lakes that 
could impact the lakes through pollution.
B. Great Lakes Charter and Its Progeny
On 11 February 1985, two Canadian provinces (Ontario and Quebec) and 
eight US states (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) signed the Great Lakes Charter: Principles 
for the Management of Great Lakes Water Resources (Great Lakes 
40 Website of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, DC, <http://geo.international.gc.ca/
can-am/washington/shared_env/q_a-en.asp> at Q12 (providing questions and answers on 
‘An Act to Amend the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act’).
41 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the U.S. and Canada (22 November 
1978), 30 U.S.T. 1384, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.
html>.
42 Ibid., Article VI(q) [emphasis added].
43 Ibid. at Annex 16.   44 Ibid., Article 1.
Book 1.indb   104 11/18/2008   5:18:16 PM
TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER RESOURCES 105
Charter).45 While not legally binding, the Great Lakes Charter establishes 
a basis for the cooperative management of the Great Lakes founded on an 
understanding that the Great Lakes Basin should be ‘recognized and treated 
as a single hydrologic system’ and ‘the natural resources and ecosystem of 
the Basin should be considered as a uni6 ed whole.’ Signi6 cantly, it expli-
citly recognizes groundwater as an integral component of the Great Lakes 
Basin and encourages the parties to consider groundwater resources in all 
activities related to the basin. Moreover, it de6 nes ‘withdrawal’ from the 
basin as ‘the removal or taking of water from surface or groundwater.’46
The Great Lakes Charter commits all of the parties to cooperate at all 
levels of government to ‘the study, monitoring, planning, and conservation 
of the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin.’ It emphasizes that the par-
ties’ ‘shared responsibility to conserve and protect the water resources of the 
Great Lakes Basin for the use, bene6 t, and enjoyment of all their  citizens’ 
and urges them to implement appropriate legislation. Moreover, it recog-
nizes the intent of the parties to notify and consult all relevant provinces 
and states prior to approving a permit or major new or increased diver-
sion or consumptive use of Great Lakes waters. Finally, the Great Lakes 
Charter commits the parties to develop and exchange data and information, 
to coordinate relevant research efforts, and, more speci6 cally, to generate 
an inventory of the basin’s surface and groundwater resources.47
In the late 1990s, a process was initiated to strengthen the objectives of 
the Great Lakes Charter culminating in the Great Lakes Charter Annex, 
A Supplementary Agreement to the Great Lakes Charter (Annex 2001).48 
While also non-binding, the Annex 2001 commits the parties to develop a 
basin-wide binding arrangement based on a broad-based public participa-
tion program, the goal of which is to ‘protect, conserve, restore, improve, 
and manage [the] use of the Waters and Water-Dependent Natural Resources 
of the Great Lakes Basin.’49
The result of the Annex 2001’s commitments was the Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement (Great 
Lakes Agreement), which was signed by the governors of the eight US states 
and the premiers of the two Canadian provinces on 13 December 2005.50 
The agreement establishes a ‘Decision Making Standard for Management 
45 Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes Charter: Principles for the Management 
of Great Lakes Water Resources (11 February 1985), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/
Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Great Lakes Charter].
46 Ibid.   47 Ibid.
48 Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes Charter Annex, A Supplementary 
Agreement to the Great Lakes Charter (18 June 2001), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.
org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
49 Ibid.
50 Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement 
(13 December 2005), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.
html> [Great Lakes Agreement].
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of Withdrawals and Consumptive Uses,’ which is applicable to new water 
withdrawals and to increases to existing withdrawals over a set minimum 
volume.51 Furthermore, it also strengthens the collection and sharing of 
technical data among the states and provinces and requires that the parties 
submit their water management programs implementing the compact for 
periodic review.52
Signi6 cantly, the Great Lakes Agreement directly encompasses ground-
water resources within its scope. It de6 nes ‘water’ as ‘ground or surface water 
contained within the [Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River] basin’ and de6 nes 
‘waters of the basin or basin water’ as ‘the Great Lakes and all streams, 
rivers, lakes, connecting channels and other bodies of water, including tribu-
tary groundwater, within the Basin.53 Under the agreement, though, the 
basin’s surface water divide is used ‘for the purpose of managing and regu-
lating new or increased diversions, consumptive uses or withdrawals of . . . 
groundwater.’54
While the Great Lakes Agreement is not intended to become a treaty and is 
not pursued at the national levels, the signatories have indicated their strong 
commitment to its terms. The Quebec national assembly has approved the 
agreement, while Ontario has actually incorporated the agreement into its 
domestic laws.55 On the US side, the eight Great Lakes states are currently 
pursuing a parallel initiative—the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin 
Water Resources Compact (Great Lakes Compact)56—which incorporates 
and would make the Great Lakes Agreement binding on the states.57 As of 
3 July 2008, Pennsylvania became the 6 nal Great Lakes state to sign the 
compact.58 All that remains for it to enter into force is for the US Congress 
to review and approve the arrangement in accordance with its responsibility 
under the US Constitution.59
51 Ibid. at sec. 4.10 and 4.11.   52 See ibid. at sec. 1.3(2)(e) and 3.4.
53 Ibid., Article 103 [emphasis added].
54 Ibid., Article 207.
55 See Implementation, Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Water Resources Regional 
Body website, <http://www.glslregionalbody.org/AgreementImplementationStatus.aspx> 
[Implementation].
56 Council of Great Lakes Governors, The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin 
Water Resources Compact (13 December 2005), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/
Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Great Lakes Compact].
57 See Implementation, supra note 55.
58 See PA on Course to OK Pact to Protect Great Lakes, Chicago Tribune, 3 July 2008, 
<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-ap-pa-xgr-greatlakescom,0,5648987.story>; see 
also Implementation, supra note 55.
59 Under the US Constitution, a compact between US states must be approved by the US 
Congress before it can enter into force. Once congressional approval is obtained, a compact 
carries the force of federal US law. US Const. art. 1 § 10, Clause 3. For additional discussion 
pertaining to compacts between US states addressing transboundary groundwater resources, 
see notes 66–83 in this article and accompanying text.
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C. Arrangements between the Canadian Province of 
British Columbia and the US State of Washington
Several regional arrangements are found along the US-Canadian  border. One 
is the 1992 Environmental Cooperation Agreement between the Province 
of British Columbia and the State of Washington (British Columbia-
Washington Agreement), which created the British Columbia-Washington 
Environmental Initiative and established the British Columbia-Washington 
Environmental Cooperation Council (British Columbia-Washington 
Council).60 The British Columbia-Washington Agreement calls for regular 
meetings and the creation of subcommittees as necessary and includes a 
number of work priorities and preliminary action plans. The Abbotsford-
Sumas Aquifer, which is located along the US-Canada border, was one of 
the listed priorities requiring immediate joint action.
At the 6 rst meeting of the British Columbia-Washington Council, the 
council created the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer International Task Force to 
respond to, and address, the identi6 ed issues.61 This taskforce, consisting of 
representatives from federal and provincial agencies from both countries, 
has mainly focused on issues related to water quality in the aquifer. The 
main objectives of the taskforce are to develop a joint groundwater man-
agement plan; coordinate efforts aimed at protecting the aquifer; develop 
aquifer management strategies using a managerial approach; and facilitate 
and coordinate education and public involvement in water management 
issues.
In response to the concern for the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer, British 
Columbia and the State of Washington signed in 1996 the Memorandum of 
Agreement Related to Referral of Water Right Applications (Abbotsford-
Sumas MOA).62 The arrangement addresses the referral of water rights 
applications ‘within or on the exterior boundaries’ of the Abbotsford-Sumas 
Aquifer on both sides of the border. It de6 nes the roles and responsibilities 
of the relevant permitting agencies to allow timely prior consultation, com-
ment period, and exchange of information on water quantity  allocations 
within each party’s territory, which ‘could potentially signi6 cantly impact 
water quantity on the other side of the border.’ It also provides for the 
60 Environmental Cooperation Agreement between the Province of British Columbia and 
the State of Washington and British Columbia (17 May 1992), <http://www.international
waterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [British Columbia-Washington Agreement].
61 Summary of 1 October 1992 meeting of the British Columbia-Washington Environmental 
Cooperation Council, <http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/spd/ecc/docs/borderline_news/meeting92.
pdf>.
62 Memorandum of Agreement Related to Referral of Water Right Applications between 
the State of Washington as represented by the Department of Ecology and the Province 
of British Columbia as represented by the Minister of Environment, Lands and Parks, 
10 October 1996, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> 
[Abbotsford-Sumas MOA].
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sharing of studies addressing water availability and the development of 
water resources within or on the boundaries of the aquifer. The Abbotsford-
Sumas MOA speci6 cally applies to all surface water, groundwater, and 
 reservoir waters.
A third arrangement in this region is the 1995 Interagency Memorandum 
of Understanding between the State of Washington Department of Ecology 
Eastern Regional Of6 ce and the Province of British Columbia Ministry of 
Environment, Lands and Parks Kootenay Region (Columbia River MOU).63 
This arrangement was designed to ‘assure continued coordination and 
cooperation relative to major environmental issues within the international 
portion of the Columbia River drainage.’64 While the Columbia River MOU 
only mentions groundwater in the scope of work attached to the document, 
and only with regard to discharges of efN uent, groundwater is implicated 
in the Columbia River MOU inasmuch as it is part of the Columbia River 
drainage basin. The MOU obligates the parties to: (1) provide timely prior 
noti6 cation of proposed discharges with potential for cross border water 
quality impacts; (2) ‘provide an opportunity for comment on planning 
activities that may have trans-boundary impacts’; (3) share environmental 
data from the international portion of the Columbia River drainage system; 
(4) provide the opportunity to review and comment on projects or activities 
with potential to cause cross border impacts; (5) ‘facilitate public informa-
tion sharing meeting’; and (6) specify contacts to facilitate the timely shar-
ing of information.65
3. Transboundary Arrangements within the United States
A. Interstate Compacts
Interstate compacts are the preferred method for resolving transbound-
ary water disputes in the United States. Compacts are like treaties in 
the sense that two sovereign states enter into an agreement over a trans-
boundary resource. All interstate compacts in the United States require 
approval by the US Congress.66 In the United States, twenty-six water 
allocation compacts are in force, at least four of which include the fed-
eral government as a signatory.67 While no interstate compacts focus 
exclusively on a transboundary aquifer, a number of the allocation com-
pacts do address  interrelated groundwater resources. These include the 
63 Interagency Memorandum of Understanding between the State of Washington 
Department of Ecology Eastern Regional Of6 ce and the Province of British Columbia 
Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks Kootenay Region (1995), <http://www.interna-
tionalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Columbia River MOU].
64 Ibid.   65 Ibid.
66 U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, para. 10, Clause 3.
67 J. Muyes, G.W. Sherk, and M.C. O’Leary, Utton Transboundary Resources Center Model 
Interstate Water Compact 47 Nat. Res. J. 17 at 21 (2007).
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yet-to-be-approved Great Lakes Compact discussed earlier68 as well as 
the following arrangements.
The Susquehanna River Basin Compact, which was adopted in 1968 by 
New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the United States,69 is one of the 
few interstate compacts that treat groundwater equally with surface water 
in terms of planning, allocation, and regulation of water use. The 1968 
 compact de6 nes ‘waters’ as meaning both surface and ground waters within 
the drainage area of the Susquehanna River. It states in Article 1.3 that 
‘[t]he water resources of the basin are functionally interrelated, and the uses 
of these resources are interdependent’ and, therefore, ‘[a] single administra-
tive agency is . . . essential for effective and economical direction, supervi-
sion, and coordination of water resources efforts and programs.’70
The 1968 compact also created a commission to assist in implementing 
the goals of the compact. Commission approval is required for all trans-
boundary water projects; projects involving diversions of water into or from 
the basin; projects that may have a ‘signi6 cant effect’ on the water resources 
of another state party; and projects that are included within the scope of the 
commission’s comprehensive plan for the development of water resources 
or that would have a ‘signi6 cant effect’ on the commission’s plan. Towards 
these objectives, the parties agree to ‘seek enactment of such additional 
legislation as will be required to enable’ the commission to accomplish its 
obligations and duties.71
In the western United States, Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska entered 
into the Republican River Compact in 1943.72 This compact allocates 
the average annual water supply of the Republican River to each state in 
speci6 c proportions.73 In 1998, Kansas 6 led a complaint before the US 
Supreme Court alleging that Nebraska had violated the compact by allow-
ing private well owners to pump groundwater hydraulically connected to 
the Republican River and its tributaries.74 Kansas claimed Nebraska was 
using more water than its allocation under the compact, thus depriving 
Kansas of its full entitlement. Colorado was joined in the lawsuit because it 
is a party to the compact and the headwaters of the Republican River rise 
within Colorado.75
68 See Great Lakes Compact, supra note 56 and accompanying text.
69 Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91–575, 84 Stat. 1509 (24 December 1970), 
<http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Susquehanna 
River Basin Compact].
70 Ibid.   71 Ibid.
72 Republican River Compact, Pub. L. No. 78–60, 57 Stat. 86 (1943), <http://www.
internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Republican River Compact].
73 Ibid.
74 John Hanna, Kansas Demands Nebraska Cut Use of Water from River and Pay Damages 
(20 December 2007), <http://climate.weather.com/articles/water122007.html>.
75 Ibid. 
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Following protracted negotiations, the three states entered into a settle-
ment agreement. Among other things, the states agreed to include in the 
count of each state’s allocation groundwater withdrawals that are deter-
mined to deplete stream N ow in the Republican River or its tributaries.76 
The states also agreed: (1) to cooperate on developing a comprehensive 
groundwater model; (2) to a moratorium on groundwater development in 
the basin upstream of Guide Rock, Nebraska; (3) on a methodology for 
determining ‘Virgin Water Supply, Computed Water Supply, Allocations, 
Imported Water Supply Credit, augmentation credit and Computed 
Bene6 cial Consumptive Use’; (4) on a process for developing a groundwater 
model for the basin; and (5) on a dispute resolution process.77
Unlike the Republican River Compact, which allocated water in pro-
portions, the Arkansas River Compact, signed in 1948 by the states of 
Colorado and Kansas, equally allocates the waters of the Arkansas River 
and their utilization between the two states.78 It also equally allocates the 
bene6 ts arising from the construction, operation, and maintenance of the 
then-planned John Martin Reservoir. Article IV-D of the compact provides 
that all future development of the Arkansas River Basin must not materi-
ally deplete the usable quantity or availability of water in the river to other 
users of the river’s waters.79 In 2001, the US Supreme Court interpreted this 
provision to include the development of groundwater resources within the 
basin.80
The Upper Niobrara River Compact, which was signed in 1962 by the 
states of Wyoming and Nebraska, was principally designed to apportion 
equitably the surface waters of the Upper Niobrara River Basin.81 However, 
the compact also acknowledges that groundwater could become an import-
ant source of irrigation water, and, therefore, it established a secondary 
objective of compiling and assessing information on ‘groundwater and 
underground water N ow’ that would assist in the future apportionment 
of such waters.82 According to Article VI(a) of the compact, groundwater 
would not be apportioned ‘until such time as adequate date [sic] on ground-
water of the basin are available.’ Articles VI further provides that to obtain 
the necessary data, the two states shall cooperate and shall bear all costs 
equally.83
76 Ibid.
77 Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado, 538 U.S. 720 (2003) (order approving the 6 nal settle-
ment stipulation).
78 Arkansas River Compact, Pub. L. No. 81–82, 63 Stat. 145 (1949), <http://www.
internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Arkansas River Compact].
79 Ibid., Article IV-D.
80 Kansas v. Colorado, 121 S.Ct. 2023 (2001).
81 Upper Niobrara River Compact, Pub. L. No. 91–52, 83 Stat. 86 (1969), <http://www.
internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Upper Niobrara River Compact].
82 Ibid., Article I(a).   83 Ibid.
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B. Congressional Mandate: The Truckee-Carson-Pyramid 
Lake Water Settlement Act (Truckee-Carson Act)84
The Truckee River Basin, located in California and Nevada, has been a 
source of contention for nearly a century. Demand for the waters of this 
basin has often been greater than its supply. As a result, beginning in 1935 
with the 6 rst Truckee River Agreement, various arrangements were devised 
to allocate the waters of the basin.85 In 1990, the US Congress enacted the 
Truckee-Carson Act, which equitably allocates the waters of the Truckee 
River, Lake Tahoe, and the Carson River between the two states.86 Although 
the act primarily focuses on surface water, it recognizes the interrelated 
nature of surface and groundwater.
Section 204(a)(5) of the Truckee-Carson Act ensures that both states, 
individually or collectively, can study the use of surface water to enable the 
conjunctive use of groundwater. Sections 204(b)(1) and 204(c)(1) include 
groundwater in the computation of allowable diversions from Lake Tahoe 
and the Truckee River, respectively. Moreover, the Act recognizes ground-
water as an integral source of freshwater and prioritizes groundwater use 
based on the location of extraction. For example, under section 204(c)(1)(C), 
any use of groundwater in Nevada, which is extracted from groundwater 
related to the Truckee River in California, is subordinate to existing and 
future uses of groundwater in California.87
In addition, the Truckee-Carson Act establishes a ‘safe yield’ standard in 
the management of groundwater interrelated to the Truckee River Basin. In 
section 204(c)(1)(C), the act provides that any use of groundwater in Nevada 
shall cease to the extent that it causes extractions to exceed the safe yield as 
determined by the United States Geological Survey and California law.88 
Furthermore, the Truckee-Carson Act, under section 210(b)(16), requires 
the secretary of the US Department of the Interior to ‘undertake appro-
priate measures to address signi6 cant adverse impacts’ on domestic uses of 
groundwater that result directly from the water purchases by the Act.89 Such 
measures must be in consultation with of6 cials from the state of Nevada and 
‘affected local interests.’ The provisions of this Act are to be implemented 
by a Truckee River Operating Agreement, which is being developed by the 
84 The Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101–618 (S 3048) 
(1990), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Truckee-
Carson Act].
85 See Truckee River Agreement (13 June 1935), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/
Local-GW-Arrangements.html>; see also J. Kramer, Lake Tahoe, the Truckee River, and 
Pyramid Lake: the Past, Present, and Future of Interstate Water Issues 19 Paci6 c L.J. 1339 
(1988).
86 Truckee-Carson Act, supra note 84.
87 Ibid. at sec. 204.   88 Ibid. at sec. 210.
89 Ibid.
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US Department of the Interior and the California Department of Water 
Resources.90
C. General Arrangements between US States
Another source of cooperation is that pursued between subnational states. 
In the United States, these are unof6 cial arrangements with no legal impli-
cations because they lack congressional approval.91 Nonetheless, such 
arrangements are similar to those between subnational units in international 
transboundary scenarios.92 For example, the Pullman-Moscow Aquifer 
Inter-Agency Agreement between the States of Washington and Idaho 
was adopted by the Washington Department of Ecology and the Idaho 
Department of Water Resources to promote coordination on the manage-
ment of the Palouse Basin Aquifer (Palouse Basin Agreement).93 Entered 
into on 18 April 1992, this arrangement formalizes the role of the previ-
ously organized Palouse Basin Aquifer Committee (PBAC) in managing the 
Palouse Basin Aquifer.94 The PBAC has developed a coordinated ground-
water management plan that sets goals and action plans for the improved 
management of the aquifer. The present arrangement requires the states to 
share information on new groundwater allocation permits as well as changes 
to old permits and requires that decisions on such requests be guided by the 
PBAC’s groundwater management plan. While 6 nal authorization remains 
with the respective state agencies, the arrangement also requires that all 
new permits and proposed change-of-permit applications be submitted to 
the PBAC for review, evaluation, and recommendation.
Another interstate groundwater arrangement is the Memorandum of 
Agreement for Maintenance and Utilization of the Numerical Model of the 
Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer between Idaho Department of 
Water Resources and Washington Department of Ecology (SVRP MOA).95 
The SVRP MOA offers guidance on how the two states will cooperate on 
water supply issues in the Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer. It is 
90 Federal Register, 10 November 2004 (Volume 69, Number 217). The Federal Register 
indicates that the public comments period for the draft agreement closed on 30 December 
2004.
91 See note 66 and accompanying text.
92 See, for example, Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
93 Pullman-Moscow Aquifer Inter-Agency Agreement between the States of Washington 
and Idaho (18 April 1992), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.
html>. The Palouse Basin Aquifer was formerly identi6 ed as the Pullman-Moscow Water 
Resources Committee. More information on this acquifer can be found at <http://www.webs.
uidaho.edu/pbac/> [Palouse Basin Agreement].
94 Ibid.
95 Memorandum of Agreement for Maintenance and Utilization of the Numerical 
Model of the Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer between Idaho Department of 
Water Resources and Washington Department of Ecology (8 October 2007), <http://www. 
internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [SVRP MOA].
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based on a jointly developed computer model for groundwater N ow that 
permits water managers on both sides of the border to enter data about 
a proposed withdrawal and determine whether the withdrawal would 
affect regional water levels.96 Of note, the MOA establishes a collabora-
tive  ‘modeling committee’ of experts from both states who are assigned the 
responsibility of managing and securing the computer model and ensuring 
that all updates are agreed upon by both sides. The committee also assesses 
proposed enhancements to the model as well as the direction of research 
intended to enhance the model.97
Along the Atlantic coast, the Georgia Environmental Protection Division 
(GA-EPD) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control (SC-DHEC) entered into the Letter Agreement between the Georgia 
Environmental Protection Division, Department of Natural Resources and 
the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 
(Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement) regarding salt-water encroach-
ment in the Hilton Head–Savannah border area on 25 October 1995.98 
The agreement details a ten-year program to develop a joint strategy for 
addressing groundwater quality and quantity problems in the Floridian 
Aquifer, which traverses the border of the two states. The Letter Agreement 
indicates that Georgia would develop a groundwater  management  strategy 
and undertake certain groundwater conservation measures to comple-
ment similar activities already in place in South Carolina. It also indicates 
that the states agree on reducing withdrawals in speci6 c locations on both 
sides of the border as a means to address groundwater quality and quantity 
issues.99
While the initial arrangement was set for ten years, the states have con-
tinued their cooperative efforts in the context of Georgia’s Coastal Sound 
Science Initiative (CSSI)100 and have worked with the US Geological 
Survey to model the region’s groundwater resources in an effort to deter-
mine how best to manage them. In a related matter, the governors of the 
two states created in June 2005 a bi-state Savannah River Committee as 
a forum for discussing issues of mutual interest related to the waters of 
the Savannah River Basin.101 While the two governors’ executive orders 
96 Ibid.   97 Ibid.
98 Letter Agreement between the Georgia Environmental Protection Division, Department 
of Natural Resources, and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental 
Control (letter from Georgia dated 29 June 1995, and from South Carolina dated 25 October 
1995), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Georgia-
South Carolina Letter Agreement].
99 Ibid.
100 See US General Attorney, Coastal Georgia Sound Science Initiative: Evaluation of 
ground-water N ow, saltwater contamination and alternative water sources, <http://ga2.
er.usgs.gov/coastal/>.
101 Governor Sonny Perdue, Executive Order on the Creation of the Governor’s Savannah 
River Committee of Georgia, signed 21 June 2005, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/
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 creating the  committees do not mention groundwater speci6 cally, the 
actions of the committee clearly indicate that groundwater is an important 
component of the effort. In October 2007, under the auspices of the com-
mittee, representatives of both the GA-EPD and SC-DHEC entered into a 
memorandum of agreement whose goal is to re6 ne the CSSI mathematical 
model and implement it as a means of preventing salt-water intrusion into 
the Floridian Aquifer.102 The Memorandum of Agreement between the 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control and the 
Georgia Environmental Protection Division creates a Technical Advisory 
Committee, composed of representatives of the two agencies and the US 
Geological Survey, which is tasked with reviewing and critiquing the model 
and identifying new scenarios for the management of the aquifer.103
D. Court Decisions
The North Platt River Settlement Decree of 2001 (2001 Decree) was 
imposed by the US Supreme Court on the states of Colorado, Nebraska, and 
Wyoming.104 The 2001 Decree resulted from the latest in a series of lawsuits 
between the three states over the waters of the North Platt River. In 1945, in 
its 6 rst decree related to the dispute (1945 Decree), the US Supreme Court 
equitably apportioned the North Platte River among Colorado, Nebraska, 
and Wyoming.105 In 1986, Nebraska sued Wyoming, claiming that the latter 
was unlawfully depleting the waters of the North Platt River in contraven-
tion of the 1945 Decree.106
The 1945 Decree focuses exclusively on surface water. This decree, how-
ever, recognizes that reservoirs on the North Platte River could lose some 
water as a result of ‘ground absorption and storage.’107 Moreover, the 1945 
Decree acknowledges that ‘seepage’ was the property of the appropriator 
even though the water originated from a surface source and may have pre-
viously been used.108 In sharp contrast, the 2001 Decree explicitly recog-
nizes that surface and groundwater resources may be hydraulically related 
and, albeit implicitly, that hydraulically related water resources should 
Local-GW-Arrangements.html>; Governor mark Sanford, Executive Order on the Creation 
of the Governor’s Savannah River Committee of South Carolina, no. 2005–14, signed 21 June 
2005, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
102 Memorandum of Agreement between the South Carolina Department of Health 
and Environmental Control and the Georgia Environmental Protection Division, signed 
15 October 2007, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
103 See US Geological Survey Project Guide Lines: Simulation of Water Levels, Saltwater 
Intrusion, and Water Management Scenarios in the Savannah-Hilton Head Island Area—
Project Period June 2007-March 2009, at 3 (2007) [on 6 le with author].
104 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 534 U.S. 40 (2001).
105 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) as modi6 ed by the court in Nebraska v. 
Wyoming, 345 U.S. 981 (1953).
106 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 479 U.S. 1051 (1987).
107 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).   108 Ibid.
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be  managed comprehensively. For example, the 2001 Decree enjoins the 
state of Wyoming from diverting water for irrigation purposes from the 
North Platte River ‘and its tributaries, including water from hydrologically 
 connected groundwater wells.’ It further notes that the consumptive use of 
irrigation water encompassed under this injunction ‘shall include . . . [w]ater 
consumed for irrigation purposes on lands irrigated by water from hydro-
logically connected groundwater wells.’109
I I I.  EM ERGI NG STAT E PR AC T ICE?
Although the water resources from the above arrangements range dramat-
ically in location, geology, and use, it is possible to discern a number of 
normative commonalities that appear applicable regardless of geography or 
local conditions. These include such areas as cooperation, data and infor-
mation sharing, joint monitoring, public participation, and a preference for 
subsidiarity and for developing local solutions for local issues. To the extent 
that the appearance of these principles in the various instruments consti-
tutes a trend, they may evidence emerging state practice.
1. Cooperation
One of the most important factors that can determine the success of an 
arrangement cannot be found in the text. A large part of water issues are 
political. Therefore, the non-tangible goals and attitudes of the parties and 
the manner in which they approach the negotiations are vital parts of the 
process.110 The arrangement needs to be N exible enough to deal with dif-
ferent situations surrounding shared groundwater but speci6 c enough to 
demand the cooperation necessary.111 Some form of cooperation is explicitly 
present in almost every one of the earlier listed arrangements. The presence 
of an agreement, formal or informal, indicates at least an implicit measure 
of cooperation among the parties. Cooperation can be applied to a variety 
of groundwater-related issues ranging from the research of a resource to the 
management and development and even the protection of an aquifer. It can 
require a party to recognize that more than one entity has a right to a water 
resource as well as acknowledge the role of water in different cultures and 
its importance in spirituality and creating a sense of place.
This obligation is often written as a reN ection of the overall purpose of 
the arrangement. All of the United States-Mexico arrangements have a 
cooperation component related to the use of the particular aquifer as well 
as the limits on withdrawal. For example, Minute 242 obligates both parties 
109 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 534 U.S. 40 (2001).
110 V. Bennett and L.A. Herzog, U.S.-Mexico Borderland Water ConE icts and Institutional 
Change: A Commentary 40 Nat. Resources J. 973 at 976 (2000).
111 D.A. Caponera and D. Alheritiere, Principles for International Groundwater Law 18 Nat. 
Resources J. 589 at 591 (1978).
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to restrict groundwater withdrawal on both sides of the border within 6 ve 
miles of the Arizona-Sonora boundary near San Luis,112 while the Juárez-El 
Paso MOU obligates the cities of Juárez and El Paso to develop and coord-
inate a compatible plan ‘to secure water supplies and extend the life of 
the Hueco Bolson.’113 In contrast, along the US-Canada border, cooper-
ation appears to be equally concerned with water quality and quantity. For 
example, the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, the 1995 Columbia River MOU, 
the 2005 Great Lakes Agreement, and the 2005 Great Lakes Compact 
include cooperation requirements related to both groundwater quantity and 
quality issues.114
At times, the type of cooperation required appears to be more basic. In 
the case of the Great Lakes Charter, the parties agree to cooperate in de6 n-
ing, studying, and managing the resource.115 The 1992 British Columbia-
Washington Agreement requires cooperation in meeting regularly and 
coordinating actions in response to shared concerns.116 In other cases, the 
obligation to cooperate is implicit. Neither the Georgia-South Carolina 
Letter Agreement nor the Georgia-South Carolina MOA explicitly mandate 
cooperation between the parties. Yet, the two arrangements are built on 
the understanding that they must cooperate if they are to accomplish their 
objectives.117
Whether or not an arrangement explicitly speci6 es cooperation, it is a 
critical part of any successful accord to share a resource. In its absence, 
other objectives will be dif6 cult, if not impossible, to achieve. Although 
112 Minute 242, supra note 20 at para. 5.
113 Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 25 at para. 3(e).
114 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 37 (discussing International Joint Commission 
approval of future diversions and other activities with possible transboundary affect in 
Articles III and IV, cooperation on Niagara River water levels above the falls in Article V, 
and cooperation in the apportionment of the St. Mary and Milk Rivers and their tributar-
ies in Article VI; also discussing an agreement not to cause pollution resulting in injury of 
health or property to the other party in Article IV); 1995 Columbia River MOU, supra note 
63 (recognizing in the MOU and Article III(a) and (b) of Attachment 1 to the MOU that the 
parties ‘mutually agree to’ cooperate over new discharges and consumptive uses); 2005 Great 
Lakes Agreement, supra note 50 (specifying the agreed-upon requirements on existing and 
new diversions and withdrawals in Articles 200–3 and 205 and those relating to water quality 
in Articles 201 and 203); 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 56 (regulating diversions and 
withdrawals in Articles 4.8–4.11 and 4.14; creating an inventory of water data related to exist-
ing quantities and proposed withdrawals, diversions and consumptive uses, as well as report-
ing requirements for certain withdrawals, diversions and consumptive uses in Article 4.1, 
and describing water conservation and ef6 ciency requirements in Article 4.2; imposing some 
criteria on water quality in Article 4.9 for water returned or introduced into the basin, and 
 conditioning withdrawals on ensuring remaining water quality in Article 4.11).
115 1985 Great Lakes Charter, supra note 45 (providing in Principle II that the parties 
 ‘recognize and commit to a spirit of cooperation . . . in the study, monitoring, planning, and 
conservation of the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin’).
116 1992 British Columbia-Washington Agreement, supra note 60, at attached terms of 
 reference and preliminary action plan/work priorities.
117 See generally notes 98–103 in this article and accompanying text.
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working together is a necessary component of any successful arrangement, 
sometimes more proactive obligations must also be present.
2. Prior Noti6 cation of Planned Activities
A logical extension of cooperation is advance noti6 cation of activity 
by one party that may adversely affect the other parties who share the 
water source.118 Within this requirement is a range of compliance alterna-
tives. Some of the arrangements reviewed require mere noti6 cation of the 
 activity, while others impose more stringent criteria and require additional 
 procedures for informing another state of planned activities.
Minute 242 is an example of the most basic consultation arrangement 
simply requiring the parties in paragraph 6 to consult each other prior to 
new development of water resources or any action that would adversely 
impact the other party.119 The Great Lakes Charter offers more detailed 
obligations in the section on implementation of principles and consultation 
procedures by requiring noti6 cation of all relevant provinces and states 
prior to ‘any new or increased diversion or consumptive use’ in excess of 
5,000,000  gallons and speci6 es opportunities for objecting to, and consult-
ing over, such proposals.120 Its progeny, the 2005 Great Lakes Agreement 
also calls for prior notice and commenting opportunities in Article 205 
for certain new and increase-in-use applications.121 In the case of the 
Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, the arrangement calls on the relevant permit-
ting agencies to provide a comment period to their counterparts across the 
border before approving a water quantity allocation.122 In a somewhat dif-
ferent approach, the 1995 Columbia River MOU allows for timely consult-
ation but, unlike the other arrangements, also incorporates an opportunity 
for ‘transboundary public comment.’123
3. Sharing of Data and Information
In order to protect a resource, it must 6 rst be understood. The realiza-
tion that a shared water arrangement is necessary often predates the full 
understanding of the resource. For this reason, a common aspect of state 
practice involves the sharing of data and information between users of a 
118 This and many of the other principles discussed in this article are well recognized in the 
international law of transboundary resources, which lends support to their application in the 
context of shared groundwater resources.
119 Minute 242, supra note 20, at para. 6.
120 1985 Great Lakes Charter, supra note 45 at ‘Implementation of Principles: Consultation 
Procedures.’
121 2005 Great Lakes Agreement, supra note 50.
122 Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, supra note 62, at sec. 2 on Scope of Work attached to the 
MOA.
123 1995 Columbia River MOU, supra note 63 (requiring in the MOU for timely noti6 ca-
tion and commenting opportunities for proposed new discharges as well as for proposed new 
consumptive uses as described in detail in Article III(a) and (b) of Attachment 1 to the MOU 
on Scope of Work).
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shared water resource. Common data collection includes water quality test-
ing, aquifer modeling, monitoring water table levels, and aquifer mapping. 
The particulars of what is incorporated into the data collection provision 
is dependent on local speci6 cs, but its presence, in some form, is critical to 
continued understanding and prudent stewardship.
Data collection can be necessary to create speci6 c use regulations 
or it can be part of ongoing operation and maintenance. An arrange-
ment written in the early stages of resource development may be more 
expansive. In the Republican River Compact, three states agreed to 
the development of a comprehensive model of the relationship between 
aquifer withdrawals and the Republican River. In other locations, where 
research has already taken place, data collection may be less inclusive or 
speci6 c. For example, in El Paso, Texas, the Hueco Bolson Aquifer has 
been heavily studied and modeled in an effort to gain accurate future 
water availability estimates. However, in the MOU between the local 
water utilities on either side of the border, both parties agree to share 
any newly gained information regarding transboundary water resources. 
To a limited extent, the US-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment 
Act contemplates expanding existing arrangements related to archiving 
and sharing relevant data.124
Provisions for joint sharing of data and information also can be found 
in a number of arrangements focusing on the US-Canada border. The 1978 
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement includes a biennial meeting to share 
monitoring data provided by both parties. The 1985 Great Lakes Charter 
recognizes joint monitoring of the water resources in the second principle, 
which focuses on cooperation. This mandate is later expanded by a descrip-
tion of a joint database ‘and the establishment of systematic arrangements 
for the exchange of water data and information.’125 Unlike other arrange-
ments, detailed information is provided about the form and type of data 
that must be supplied as part of monitoring efforts.
The Great Lakes Compact provides that a chief purpose of the compact 
is ‘[t]o facilitate the exchange of data, strengthen the scienti6 c informa-
tion base upon which decisions are made and engage in consultation on 
the potential effects of proposed Withdrawals and losses on the Waters and 
Water Dependent Natural Resources of the Basin.’126 Similarly, parties to 
the Abbotsford-Sumas MOA must ‘cooperate in sharing relevant water 
quantity information necessary to provide management of those water 
resources.’127 The arrangement between the cities of El Paso and Ciudad 
124 See US-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, supra note 31 at 
Article 4(b)(2)(B).
125 Great Lakes Charter, supra note 45.
126 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 56 at Article 1.3(2)(e).
127 Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, supra note 62.
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Juarez also recognizes the history of, and implicates the continued need for, 
shared technical information about the Hueco Bolson Aquifer.128
4. Public Participation
The inclusion of the public is paramount to achieving success in any shared 
use arrangement. True participation means that no one is excluded from 
participation in the decision-making processes and institutions necessary 
for human survival and ful6 lment, including those relating to water. ‘Public 
involvement holds the promise of improving the management of international 
watercourses and reducing the potential for conN ict over water issues.’129 
Participation improves the quality of decisions, facilitates the decision-
making process, improves credibility, and enhances implementation.130
A number of the documents reviewed explicitly list public participa-
tion as a condition of the arrangement. For example, the second direct-
ive of the Great Lakes Charter Annex speci6 cally calls for the governors 
and premiers to commit to a process that ensures public input. The 1995 
Columbia River MOU provides the public an ‘opportunity to review and 
comment in writing or verbally on a proposal under consideration by the 
agency with jurisdiction.’131 The Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement 
is more speci6 c, requiring public meetings and hearings to establish a 
‘Coastal Groundwater Management Strategy.’132 Public meetings with 
suf6 cient notice are also a condition of the Susquehanna River Basin 
Commission.133
Often, some arrangements do not overtly call for public participation but, 
rather, incorporate public participation opportunities through other de6 ned 
processes. For example, the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer has an active stake-
holder group that includes concerned citizens as well as representatives 
from federal, provincial, and local government agencies.134 The Truckee 
River has a comparable watershed council.135 Domestic legal requirements 
can also promote participation by requiring public dissemination of pro-
posed projects with opportunities for public comment. The SVRP MOA, 
for example, requires the Model Committee, which is organized by the 
ldaho Department of Water Resources in conjunction with the Washington 
Department of Ecology, to establish protocols and procedures for  publicly 
128 Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 25.
129 Carl Bruch et al., From Theory to Practice: An Overview of Approaches to Involving the 
Public in International Watershed Management, in Carl Bruch et al., eds., Public Participation 
in the Governance of International Freshwater Resources, 3 at 3 (2005).
130 Ibid. at 6.
131 Columbia River MOU, supra note 63.
132 Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement, supra note 98.
133 Susquehanna River Basin Compact, supra note 69, Article 15.4.
134 Discover Abbotsford, <http://www.abbotsford.ca/Page133.aspx>.
135 See Truckee River Watershed Council, <http://www.truckeeriverwc.org/>.
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disseminating updated versions of the groundwater N ow model of the 
Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer.136 In addition, US interstate 
compacts adopted by US state legislatures, such as those on the Arkansas 
and Republican rivers, are subject to domestic state procedures, which 
typically include public hearings and comment opportunities. Although it 
is more effective to ensure participation by speci6 cally  including it in an 
arrangement, such secondary opportunities can still encourage involvement 
by interested stakeholders.
5. Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity suggests that social decision making ought to 
be handled by the lowest level of competent authority.137 It emphasizes a 
bottom-up approach and contends that those with the greatest interest in 
the resolution of a problem are best suited to respond to the problem.138 
In consequence, the principle reN ects a presumption for a decentralization 
of decision making.139 Accordingly, subsidiarity is justi6 ed on the grounds 
that ‘decentralized decisions generally, but not always, will be  better 
informed, will better reN ect the values and preferences of those affected, 
will be more adaptable to improving knowledge and changing circum-
stances, and will lead to better results in terms of maintaining a sustainable 
human environment.’140 Another advantage relates to the degree of agility 
with which local of6 cials can respond to a water challenge as compared to 
of6 cials at higher and more distant levels of government.
While the nations of North America do not formally subscribe to the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity by name, the concepts of federalism in all three coun-
tries do reN ect signi6 cant deference to subnational decision-making bodies. 
As a result, a de facto system of subsidiarity arguably exists for addressing 
transboundary groundwater resources on the continent. The majority of 
the documents examined in this study evidence a pattern of local author-
ities tackling local groundwater challenges without involving the national 
governments of the respective nations. Signi6 cantly, such initiatives were 
taken at various levels of local and regional government. The Juárez-El 
Paso MOU, for example, represents an effort taken at the lowest political 
level—the public water utilities of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez—in an effort 
to address the challenges posed by the transboundary utilization of the 
136 See SVRP MOA, supra note 95 at 1(d).
137 See R.K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution 35 Ind. 
L. Rev. 103 at 142 (2001) (noting that ‘subsidiarity, at its core, envisions a society in which 
problems are solved and decisions made from the bottom up’); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity 
as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 38 at 42 (2003).
138 J.L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulations More Adaptive through 
Decentralization: The Case for Subsidiarity 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1377 at 1381–2 (2004).
139 Ibid. at 1381.
140 Ibid. at 1378 [emphasis in original].
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Hueco Bolson Aquifer.141 The British Columbia-Washington Agreement, 
the Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, and the Columbia River MOU also consti-
tute examples of a de facto system of subsidiarity, albeit at a higher level 
of authority. All three arrangements were pursued and implemented at 
the state and province levels for the purpose of addressing transboundary 
groundwater resources along the border between Washington State and the 
province of British Columbia.142 The same can be said of the Great Lakes 
Charter and its progeny, the 2005 Great Lakes Agreement and 2005 Great 
Lakes Compact.143
Within the United States, subsidiarity appears to be more of6 cially 
sanctioned to the extent that the US Constitution reserves to the states 
all power and authority not delegated to the federal government or pro-
hibited by the Constitution.144 Thus, the various compacts between US 
states considered in this article represent more of a de jure system of sub-
sidiarity, albeit with some national oversight in the guise of congressional 
approval.145 To a similar extent, the Palouse Basin Agreement, the SVRP 
MOA, the Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement, and Georgia-South 
Carolina MOA also constitute examples of subsidiarity in the context of 
addressing transboundary groundwater resources.146 However, since they 
do not require congressional approval, they might be classi6 ed as examples 
of de facto subsidiarity.
I V.  T H E SIGN I F ICA NCE OF L O CA L A R R A NGEM EN T S
Of the seventeen documents reviewed in this article that address international 
transboundary aquifers, only 6 ve constitute of6 cial international agree-
ments: Minutes 242 and 289 of the IBWC, the La Paz Agreement between the 
US and Mexico, the US-Canadian 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, and 1978 
Great Lakes Agreement.147 Of these, only Minute 242  directly addresses 
transboundary aquifer issues. While the other international instruments do 
141 See discussion of the Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
142 See discussion of the British Columbia-Washington Agreement, supra note 60, 
Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, supra note 63, and Columbia River MOU, supra notes 63, and 
accompanying text for all.
143 See discussion of the Great Lakes Charter, supra note 45, 2005 Great Lakes Agreement, 
supra note 50, and 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 56 and accompanying text for all.
144 U.S. Constitution, amend. X. See D.W. Kmiec, Liberty Misconceived: Hayek’s Incomplete 
Relationship Between Natural and Customary Law 40 Am. J. Juris. 209 at 215 (1995) (portray-
ing subsidiarity as a component of the Tenth Amendment).
145 See discussion of the Arkansas River Compact, supra note 78, Republican River 
Compact, supra note 72, Susquehanna River Basin Compact, supra note 69, and Upper 
Niobrara River Compact, supra note 81, and accompanying text for all.
146 See discussion of the Palouse Basin Agreement, supra note 92, SVRP MOU, supra 
note 94, and Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement, supra note 97, and accompanying 
text for all.
147 Of6 cial international agreements here are understood as agreements between nations.
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contemplate cross-border groundwater resources, they do so very indirectly 
and only as a secondary or tertiary concern.
Of the remaining twelve instruments, as well as the six US compacts 
reviewed, all can be construed as either unof6 cial international (meaning 
that they are not formally recognized by the respective sovereigns) arrange-
ments or subnational transboundary arrangements. As such, they are not 
binding under international law and provide little if any evidence of inter-
national law or obligations. Yet, all of these arrangements are noteworthy 
because, to varying extents, all of them directly address groundwater issues 
that traverse political boundaries. Two complementary conclusions can be 
drawn from this fact.
The 6 rst suggests that the countries of North America have found it more 
practical to manage transboundary aquifers at the local, rather than at the 
national, level. Although similar in concept to the principle of subsidiarity 
discussed earlier,148 it is not based on political or social interests. Rather, 
it is a function of practicality and is readily understood when considering 
the appropriateness of a global versus a local approach to the management 
of freshwater resources in general. While global framework agreements for 
transboundary water resources may yet prove to be functional,149 detailed 
global arrangements are probably ineffective and inappropriate primarily 
because the circumstances and conditions of each transboundary water 
body make it globally unique. Aquifers often affect a restricted commu-
nity with individual concerns.150 Geologic, hydrologic, and climatic char-
acteristics, as well as distinctive social, developmental, cultural, and other 
factors, often require very speci6 c considerations of local circumstances. 
Moreover, although concerns addressed in disparate regions may appear 
facially similar, the water challenge in each is typically locally unique neces-
sitating locally tailored solutions.151
148 See discussion of subsidiarity in notes 137–46 in this article and accompanying text.
149 For example, while the 1997 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, a framework convention, has not yet come into force, state 
 practice suggests that it has inN uenced the development of various regional agreements. See 
G. Eckstein, Development of International Water Law and the UN Watercourse Convention, 
in A.R. Turton and R. Henwood, eds, Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern 
African Perspective 81 at 88–9 (2002). Similarly, in its current effort to formulate inter-
national legal principles applicable to transboundary aquifers, the UN International Law 
Commission has sought to develop principles that apply only generally to all transboundary 
aquifers and that provide states with a framework for more speci6 c aquifer agreements tai-
lored to each aquifer’s and region’s unique traits. Cf. Eckstein, supra note 2 at 608.
150 See, for example, Hector M. Arias, International Groundwaters: The Upper San Pedro 
River Basin Case 40 Nat. Resources J. 199 (2000).
151 It is noteworthy that this ‘bottom-up’ approach, although typically successful, may not 
be appropriate in all situations. See Huffman, supra note 138 at 1381: ‘Only where the lower 
bodies prove ineffective should the federal government become involved.’ See R.K. Vischer, 
Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution 35 Ind. L. Rev. 103 (2001). 
Factors and characteristics, such as the geographic scale of a transboundary aquifer, for 
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The majority of arrangements discussed in this article illustrate the advan-
tages of a regional approach. They address local concerns in a way that is 
both reN ective of, and responsive to, local and regional cultures, knowledge, 
needs, and capabilities. For example, the management techniques and allo-
cation regimes employed for the Hueco Bolson Aquifer underlying the city of 
El Paso in Texas, United States, and Ciudad Juarez, in Chihuahua, Mexico, 
is entirely inappropriate for the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer found along the 
border between the US state of Washington and the Canadian province of 
British Columbia. While the 6 rst is an alluvial aquifer located in an arid 
climate with a rapidly growing population, where the aquifer serves as one 
of the few sources of water for the entire region, the latter is a mostly uncon-
6 ned aquifer composed of uncompacted glacial sands and gravels in a more 
temperate climate.152 In these two examples, local of6 cials were best able to 
determine the appropriate mechanism for their unique water challenges. In 
the case of the Hueco Bolson Aquifer, the municipal utility companies of 
the bordering sister cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez responded to their 
unique water challenge by entering into a memorandum of understanding 
that focuses on cooperation and the exchange of information.153 In the case 
of the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer, a series of arrangements were forged at 
the state and provincial level discussing the roles and interaction of relevant 
permitting agencies and providing for consultation and the exchange of 
information, as well as creating a joint task force to develop, among others, 
a joint management plan and aquifer management strategies.154
The second conclusion that may be derived from the fact that all of 
the arrangements directly address groundwater issues traversing polit-
ical boundaries is that, to the extent that these pacts indicate how nations 
behave in relation to such resources, they may be considered as evidence 
for the development of customary international law. An assessment of the 
twelve unof6 cial international arrangements suggests that the countries of 
North America allow subnational political units to enter into  arrangements 
example, may dictate the level of administrative authority necessary to respond to the issues 
and challenges posed. Thus, where an aquifer or aquifer basin at issue is contained within a 
limited region, local control of decision-making may suf6 ce. However, where the water chal-
lenge involves an aquifer or aquifer basin that transects a much larger area, a local arrange-
ment may be less effective and appropriate.
152 United States Department of the Interior, Simulated Ground-Water Flow in the 
Hueco Bolson, an Alluvial-Basin Aquifer System near El Paso, Texas 1(4) Water Resources 
Investigations Report 02–4108 (2003); Jacek Scibek and Diana M. Allen, Modeled Climate 
Change Impacts in the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer, Central Fraser Lowland of BC, Canada 
and Washington State, 1–2 Proceedings of the 2005 Puget Sound Georgia Basin Research 
Conference, <http://www.engr.washington.edu/epp/psgb/2005psgb/2005proceedings/Papers/
E3_SCIBE.pdf>.
153 See Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
154 See Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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addressing transboundary aquifers. At the very least, it suggests that the 
countries overlook such conduct. In either case, the result is state prac-
tice for the purpose of determining customary international law, which, 
in this case, might be interpreted as a preference by the nations of North 
America for local solutions to transboundary groundwater issues. A similar 
conclusion can be derived from a review of the six US compacts presented 
earlier.155
V. CONCLUSION
The growing reliance on local and regional agreements for addressing 
water challenges posed by transboundary groundwater resources in North 
America indicates a trend in how various levels of government respond 
to such challenges. Local and regional authorities are no longer waiting 
for the national governments to exercise jurisdiction over transboundary 
shared aquifers. Rather, they are negotiating and dealing with their water 
challenges on their own and at their own levels of authority. At the same 
time, though, the national governments of North America seem to ignore, 
if not tolerate, such conduct. This approach appears to differ somewhat 
from the European experience where local authorities have explicit author-
ity to enter into cross-border arrangements under the European Outline 
Convention.156 Nonetheless, the fact that so many of these arrangements 
are concluded at the local level certainly suggests the development of state 
practice in North America on the subject. Moreover, it indicates that trans-
boundary groundwater resources are a legitimate subject for international 
cooperation.
Many of the principles shared by the various North American arrange-
ments discussed in this article are well-recognized aspects of international 
law and those of transboundary resources generally. These principles are 
now applied in the groundwater context at a regional level. To the extent 
that such arrangements represent state practice, they may evidence evolving 
customary international law in the 6 eld. Moreover, both the formats of these 
agreements and the included normative commonalities can be construed 
as contributing to such development. To some extent, this may be a trend 
155 While interstate arrangements between subnational political units do not neces-
sarily provide evidence of international state practice, they can, at the very least, be 
instructive because the issues addressed between the units sharing an aquifer are vir-
tually identical to those experienced among nations sharing an aquifer. Moreover, 
applying national legal constructs to international law is not unique. For example, the 
internationally accepted ‘equitable and reasonable utilization’ norm evolved from the 
‘equitable apportionment’ principle developed the by US Supreme Court in its settlement 
of interstate disputes among US states. See S.C. McCaffrey, The Law of International 
Watercourses, at 305 (2001).
156 See European Outline Convention, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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by omission—meaning that by staying out of the arrangements achieved 
at the local and regional levels, the national governments have acted in a 
manner that establishes state practice. Regardless, this trend should not be 
ignored. Moreover, the appropriateness and applicability of the principles 
at the heart of this trend should be considered seriously in the context of 
other transnational groundwater situations. Considering the experiences 
and results of the arrangements discussed in this article, these principles 
may serve as effective tools for successfully managing shared groundwater 
resources.
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